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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RODRIGUEZ, District Judge. 
 
I. 
 
At issue in this case is whether the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel applies to bar a claim of fraudulent conveyance 
and fraud alleged against a transferee of real property, 
where an arbitrator awarded damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty and fraud against the transferor of that 
property, but seemingly dismissed all other claims against 
the transferor, including the claim that he fraudulently 
conveyed the disputed property. 
 
After extensive arbitration hearings which did not involve 
the transferee of the real property in question here, the 
arbitrator awarded the plaintiffs to that action $150,000 
based on the defendant's breach of fiduciary duty and fraud 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 1001 et seq. This award also 
dismissed in their entirety, but without specificity, other 
claims pressed against many other defendants. At the 
request of the prevailing plaintiffs, the District Court 
confirmed the arbitrator's award in all respects. 
Subsequently, based on that award and the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, the District Court granted the defendant 
transferee's motion for summary judgment. Judgment was 
thus entered, dismissing the fraudulent conveyance claim 
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against the defendant transferee contained in Count V of 
plaintiffs' complaint. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
Appellants in this action are Dr. Joseph A. Witkowski, 
individually, and as trustee of his pension plan, Joseph A. 
Witkowski, M.D., P.C. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, along 
with his wife, Grace, who is a beneficiary of the plan 
(collectively, "the Witkowskis"). Appellants were the 
plaintiffs in the underlying action claiming, inter alia, that 
a conveyance of real property was fraudulent and should be 
set aside. The principal defendant in the underlying 
controversy was Robert G. Welch ("Welch"), individually and 
as a General Partner and Trustee of other entities. These 
other legal entities which he allegedly controlled were also 
named as defendants in a five count complaint. 2 Finally, 
named as a defendant, but only to Count V of the 
Witkowskis' second amended complaint, was appellee 
Ronald J. Srein ("Srein"), the transferee of real property in 
which the Witkowskis now claim an interest. 
 
A. 
 
The events leading up to this appeal began in July of 
1986, when the Witkowskis invested retirement funds held 
by a retirement plan3 in an entity controlled by Welch.4 
Specifically, the Witkowskis invested $150,000 for the 
purchase of a 19.23% `Mortgage Participation Interest' 
which they believed was to be used to finance the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The other named defendants include: Robert G. Welch, P.C.; Intrepid 
One Services, Inc., a corporation controlled by Welch; and Historical 
Second Street Development Associates, a limited partnership with Welch 
acting as the General Partner. 
 
3. This plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 1001 et. seq. 
 
4. Welch was introduced to Grace and Joseph Witkowski back in 1991, 
when Welch formed Joseph A. Witkowski, P.C. for them. Over the next 
five years, the Witkowskis were impressed with his credentials as a 
lawyer and financial advisor, and came to rely upon him for legal and 
financial advice. 
 
                                3 
  
acquisition or renovation of 70 - 72 North Second Street in 
Philadelphia. The check drawing this money from their 
account was made payable to Historical Second Street 
Development Associates ("Historical"). A subscription 
agreement described the investment interests as 
"speculative investments which involve a substantial degree 
of risk." App. 211-12. The Witkowskis believed that a 
mortgage was to be made to Historical, a limited 
partnership which Welch controlled either as a trustee or 
general partner. They also believed that this mortgage, once 
recorded, would be the first on the property and thus serve 
to secure the investment. Apparently, no mortgage interest 
was ever recorded in Historical's name.5  
 
What the record does reflect, however, is that a 
$1,400,000 mortgage was on the property, and that this 
mortgage was held by an entity called Follansbee-Merion 
Historic Associates ("FMHA"), another entity related to 
Welch. This mortgage first encumbered the property on 
December 31, 1985, yet it was not recorded until April of 
1990. According to the testimony of Welch, FMHA was the 
mortgagee of the property, and Historical was the 
mortgagor. This, of course, was the same entity in which 
the Witkowskis bought an interest for $150,000. 
 
Srein entered this situation in July 1989 when, at the 
request of Welch, he invested $300,000 in a limited 
partnership called St. George Mortgage Associates. The 
record contains a subscription agreement signed by Welch, 
however, it was neither notarized nor signed by Srein. 
According to Welch's testimony, this investment found its 
way into the FMHA account, and was used for renovations 
and improvements to the property at 70-72 North Second 
Street.6 When Welch failed to make payments as required of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. According to Welch, the property in question at North 70-72 Second 
Street was purchased by Historical sometime in 1985, before the 
Witkowskis made their initial investment. 
 
6. The Appellees strongly dispute this contention. According to the 
testimony of Bernard Egan, C.P.A., at the arbitration hearing, the money 
that went into St. George was initially transferred to FMHA, which then 
disbursed several checks, including one for $320,000 to the Kenver 
Corporation (yet another legal entity controlled by Welch). Money 
disbursed from the account of this corporation does not reveal expenses 
paid for the benefit of Historical. App. 343-45. 
 
                                4 
  
him to Srein, legal action was threatened. To assuage Srein, 
Welch executed a personal $300,000 promissory note 
in January 1990. However, payments still were not 
forthcoming. 
 
On July 19, 1990, after another threat of legal action, 
Welch offered a first mortgage on the property at 70-72 
North Second Street to secure the debt (including now the 
personal debt he owed), allegedly telling Srein that his 
investment was used to improve that property. Welch 
purportedly assured Srein that, as the General Partner of 
Historical, he had the full authority to encumber the 
property. Srein accepted the offer, and Welch and Historical 
executed a promissory demand note and mortgage on the 
property in the amount of $500,000. This was to cover 
Srein's original investment, plus interest, an additional 
$50,000 that was part of the bargain, and related attorneys 
fees and costs. Welch also agreed to subordinate thefirst 
mortgage on the property, held by FMHA, to Srein's 
interest. 
 
In January 1991, after not receiving payments, Srein 
initiated an action based on the demand note. Shortly 
thereafter, the property at 70 - 72 South Second Street was 
deeded to Srein from Historical in lieu of foreclosure. Welch 
and related entities were released from liability due to the 
transfer. The Witkowskis therefore claim Srein is properly a 
defendant transferee for the purpose of setting aside his 
ownership of the Second Street property which was 
originally owned by Historical, because it was fraudulently 
conveyed to him. 
 
B. 
 
The Witkowskis commenced an action principally against 
Welch, and the other entities he controlled, but they also 
named Srein in Count V of the plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. Count I, against Welch and Welch P.C., alleges 
that as investment advisors and fiduciaries to the 
Witkowskis' retirement plan, the $150,000 investment 
made to Historical constituted self-dealing and a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Count II also concerns the $150,000 
investment, and alleges that the scheme to convert that 
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money to the defendant's own use constituted fraud. 
Counts III and IV alleged fraud concerning the investment 
by the Witkowskis' retirement plan into two other Welch- 
controlled ventures known as the Medic Monitor, and St. 
George Mortgage Associates, which are not relevant here. 
Count V, which names Srein as a defendant, is a 
fraudulent conveyance claim regarding the ownership and 
rights to the property at 70-72 North Second Street, 
Philadelphia. Count V claims that Srein paid no 
consideration for the property, and that he fraudulently 
conspired with Welch to defraud the retirement plan by 
filing false mortgages to permit Srein to leapfrog prior 
interests in the property. 
 
The District Court, upon motion by defendant Welch, 
ordered that Counts I, II and V be subject to arbitration in 
accordance with the Agreement of Participation signed by 
the Witkowskis. The remaining matters were stayed 
pending the completion of arbitration. Defendant Srein, 
only named in Count V, filed a motion for reconsideration 
arguing that he was not a party to the participation 
agreement which compelled arbitration, and thus he should 
not be required to submit to it. The District Court agreed, 
and in a January 11, 1994 order directed that "Count V of 
the complaint involving Defendant Srein shall not be 
compelled to arbitration" but that "[t]he arbitration shall 
proceed in all other respects as previously ordered." App. 
98. Whether this order removed the fraudulent conveyance 
issue with respect to all defendants, as the Witkowskis 
contend, or whether it simply removed Srein from the 
arbitration process while still mandating the other 
defendants to fully arbitrate that issue, is the gravamen of 
the present controversy. 
 
After extensive hearings an arbitrator dismissed all of the 
Witkowskis' state law fraud claims contained in Counts I 
and II but found the defendants liable under ERISA claims 
in those same counts. An award of $150,000 was granted. 
Because this appeal centers directly on what the arbitrator 
did and did not decide, his opinion is set forth in detail. 
 
AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR 
 
       I. THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been 
       designated in accordance with the Court Orders dated 
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       March 11, 1993 and January 11, 1994, and having 
       duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, 
       AWARD as follows: 
 
       1. All state court common law claims of JOSEPH A. 
       WITKOWSKI, M.D., GRACE WITKOWSKI, JOSEPH A. 
       WITKOWSKI, M.D., P.C. DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION 
       PLAN, hereinafter referred to as CLAIMANTS, set forth 
       in Count I and II, are dismissed because of the: 
 
        1.1 Expiration of the Statute of Limitations, and/or 
 
        1.2 Failure to be pleaded and/or 
 
        1.3 Failure of proofs 
 
        2. All claims against ROBERT G. WELCH, TRUSTEE 
        SET FORTH in Count II, paragraphs 19-22 inclusive, 
        are dismissed, because the designation of "ROBERT G. 
        WELCH, TRUSTEE" is an insufficient designation of a 
        Trustee, as a defendant. Without a designation of the 
        Trust against which the claim is made, the designation 
        of "ROBERT G. WELCH, TRUSTEE" is not a party sui 
        juris. 
 
        3. The defense of the Statute of Limitations to th e filing 
        of the ERISA claim, is Dismissed. 
 
        4. The claims of CLAIMANTS against INTREPID ONE 
        SERVICES, INC., HISTORICAL SECOND STREET 
        DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, AND ROBERT G. 
        WELCH, GENERAL PARTNER, are denied. 
 
        5. On the ERISA claim, set forth in Counts I and I I of 
        CLAIMANTS' Complaint, an Award is entered in favor 
        of JOSEPH A. WITKOWSKI, M.D., P.C., DEFINED 
        BENEFIT PENSION PLAN and against ROBERT G. 
        WELCH AND ROBERT G. WELCH, P.C., jointly and 
        severally, in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY 
        THOUSAND DOLLARS ($150,000.00). 
 
       *   *   *   * 
 
        9. This Award is in full settlement of all claims 
        submitted to this arbitration. 
 
App. 134-35. 
 
                                7 
  
At the request of the Witkowskis, this award was 
subsequently confirmed by the District Court `in all 
respects.' Srein amended his complaint to include the 
defenses of arbitration and award and collateral estoppel, 
and then moved for summary judgment. Srein argued that 
because the arbitrator dismissed the Witkowskis' claim that 
Welch, the transferor, fraudulently conveyed the property, 
collateral estoppel should bar the Witkowskis from 
asserting any claim against Srein, who was the mere 
transferee in the transaction. The District Court agreed and 
granted Srein's motion. The Witkowskis appeal from that 
ruling. 
 
C. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1). We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment is plenary, and 
we test the record by the same standard which the District 
Court was required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 to utilize. Kelley v. 
TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1192 (3d. Cir. 1988). 
This standard requires the trial judge to enter summary 
judgment if there is no dispute as to material facts and if 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
In this case, as in Kelley, the District Court made no 
findings regarding the existence of material facts, but 
instead rested its decision solely on the preclusive effect of 
the arbitrator's award. Factual disputes, ordinarily resolved 
on a motion for summary judgment in favor of the non- 
moving party, are not implicated in this appellate review. 
Accordingly, the only question on appeal is whether the 
District Court correctly applied the law in holding that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the Witkowskis' claim 
of fraud and fraudulent conveyance against defendant 
Srein, the transferee of real property.7  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that appellate courts, even within this Circuit, have reviewed 
the application and non-application of collateral estoppel under differing 
standards. Compare Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 
1995) (abuse of discretion standard applies to review of District Court's 
decision to apply collateral estoppel), McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 
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III. 
 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, now commonly 
referred to as issue preclusion,8 prevents parties from 
litigating again the same issues when a court of competent 
jurisdiction has already adjudicated the issue on its merits, 
and a final judgment has been entered as to those parties 
and their privies. Schroeder v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., 972 
F.2d 41, 45 (3d. Cir. 1992). Issue preclusion "forecloses re- 
litigation in a later action[ ] of an issue of fact or law which 
was actually litigated and which was necessary to the 
original judgment." Hebden v. Workmen's Compensation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
908 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1990) (same), with Dici v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1996) (plenary review of 
doctrine's application) and Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 958 F.2d 
532, 534 (3d Cir. 1992) (same). See also Winters v. Diamond Shamrock 
Chemical Co., 149 F.3d 387, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1998) (abuse of discretion 
standard applies); Keystone Shipping Co. v. New England Power Co., 109 
F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1997) (de novo review of application of issue 
preclusion); Berger Transfer & Storage v. Central States, Southeast and 
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 85 F.3d 1374, 1376 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(decision not to apply issue preclusion reviewed for abuse of discretion); 
Town of North Bonneville v. Callaway, 10 F.3d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 
1993) (availability of collateral estoppel is a mixed question of law and 
fact subject to de novo review); Bates v. Union Oil Co. of California, 944 
F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 1991) (abuse of discretion standard applies); 
Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 1992) 
vacated and remanded for dismissal, 1993 WL 524680 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(de novo standard applies to availability of collateral estoppel, abuse of 
discretion standard applies to fairness of applying estoppel); United 
States v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 894 F.2d 825, 826 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 810, 111 S.Ct. 45, 112 L.Ed.2d 21 (1990) (de novo review). We 
need not resolve whether or not an abuse of discretion standard should 
apply to some facets of the collateral estoppel analysis because even 
under the more exacting plenary review, the result of this case is the 
same. 
 
8. This doctrine is often confused with res judicata, which is now 
commonly referred to as claim preclusion. Claim preclusion "gives 
dispositive effect to a prior judgment if the particular issue, albeit not 
litigated in the prior action, could have been raised." Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted). Issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel),"bars relitigation 
only 
of an issue identical to that adjudicated in the prior action." Id. 
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Appeal Bd., 534 Pa. 327, 330, 632 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1993); 
see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments,S 27 cmt. c 
(1982) ("An issue on which relitigation is foreclosed may be 
one of evidentiary fact, of `ultimate fact' (i.e. the application 
of law to fact), or of law."). As the Supreme Court has 
observed, this doctrine reduces the costs of multiple 
lawsuits, facilitates judicial consistency, conserves 
resources, and "encourage[s] reliance on adjudication." 
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 
L. Ed.2d 308 (1980). 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has cited approvingly 
to the Restatement of Judgments for the rule of issue 
preclusion. See Pennsylvania State Univ. v. County of 
Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 148-49, 615 A.2d 303, 306 (1992). 
The Restatement explains: "When an issue of fact or law is 
actually litigated and determined by a valid andfinal 
judgment, and the determination is essential to the 
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent 
action between the parties, whether on the same or a 
different claim." Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 27 
(1982). 
 
Stated another way, both parties agree that the following 
four requirements must be met in order to apply the 
doctrine and thus bar a potential claim: 
 
       1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication mus t be 
       identical with the one presented in the later action; 
 
       2) there must have been a final judgment on the 
       merits; 
 
       3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
       asserted must have been a party or in privity with the 
       party to the prior adjudication; and 
 
       4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
       asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to 
       litigate the issue in question in the prior adjudication. 
 
Bortz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 546 Pa. 77, 
81-82, 683 A.2d 259, 261 (1996); Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Williams, 463 Pa. 567, 574, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (1975); 
Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 528-30, 673 A.2d 872, 874 
(1966); Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1194; Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. 
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Of Ed., 913 F.2d 1064, 1073 (3d Cir. 1990) Gregory v. 
Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 121 (3d Cir. 1988); Rider v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982, 989-90 (3d. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 993, 109 S.Ct. 556, 102 
L.Ed.2d 582 (1988). 
 
A. 
 
We have no doubt that the second and third criteria for 
issue preclusion have been fulfilled in this case. The 
doctrine of collateral estoppel can apply to the arbitration 
process in which the Witkowskis obtained a judgment 
against Welch, and that judgment could potentially bar 
them from pressing claims against Srein.9  Under 
Pennsylvania law, arbitration proceedings and their 
findings are considered final judgments for the purposes of 
collateral estoppel. See Dyer v. Travelers, 572 A.2d 762, 
764 (Pa. Super. 1990) ("An arbitration award from which no 
appeal is taken has the effect of a final judgment on the 
merits."); Ottaviano v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans. 
Auth., 239 Pa. Super. 363, 370, 361 A.2d 810, 814 (1976); 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 84 (1982) ("[A] valid 
and final award by arbitration has the same effects under 
the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions 
and qualifications, as a judgment of a court."); Id. S 13 
("[F]or purposes of issue preclusion ... `final judgment' 
includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Witkowskis argue strenuously that the results of the arbitration 
cannot be a final judgment on the merits. They argue this conclusion for 
the following reason: 
 
       Inasmuch as Count V was completely ignored by the award of the 
       Arbitrator, and in that both Historical, and Welch as General 
       Partner of Historical, are included in Count V, it cannot be said 
that 
       there has been a final judgment on the merits of either the 
       fraudulent conveyance averments in Count V or on the non- 
       fiduciary liability of Defendant Srein. 
 
Appellants' Br. 17. 
 
This argument is not properly addressed in the `final judgment on the 
merits' prong of collateral estoppel. Such argument is relevant to, and 
will be considered during, the `identity of issues' and `full and fair 
opportunity to litigate' analyses infra. 
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action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be 
accorded conclusive effect.") The Witkowskis, in fact, had 
this award confirmed in full by the District Court. See 9 
U.S.C. S 13 ("The judgment [confirming an arbitration 
award] so entered shall have the same force and effect, in 
all respects, as, and be subject to all the provisions of law 
relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced 
as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which 
it is entered.") Moreover, the full arbitration proceeding was 
`on the merits' because the arbitrator dismissed all state 
claims based on either the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, the failure to be pleaded, and/or failures of 
proof. Such grounds for the dismissals constitute a 
judgment `on the merits.' See e.g., Mellon Bank v. Rafsky, 
369 Pa.Super. 585, 594, 535 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1987) 
(failure to produce sufficient evidence supports collateral 
estoppel); Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 27 cmt. d 
(1982) ("A determination may be based on a failure of the 
pleading or of proof as well as on the sustaining of the 
burden of proof.") Finally, the Witkowskis were a party to 
the prior proceeding, and thus, the third requirement was 
obviously fulfilled.10 What remains in contention is whether 
the issues were identical and whether there was a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the prior 
proceeding. Each issue will be addressed in turn. 
 
B. 
 
The District Court found that the issue decided in the 
arbitration hearing was identical to the questions raised in 
Count V of the Witkowskis' second amended complaint. 
According to the district court, any claim against Srein was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The fact that Srein was not a party, and in fact may have refused to 
testify at the arbitration hearing without being subpoenaed, is of no 
consequence to the application of collateral estoppel. Mutuality of the 
parties, once the rule, has now been abolished in Pennsylvania. See In 
re Estate of Ellis, 460 Pa. 281, 286-87, 333 A.2d 728, 730 31 (1975); 
Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 616 F.2d 704, 707 (3d Cir. 1980). 
The only requirement is, logically, that the party against whom estoppel 
is asserted be a party to the prior adjudication. This was the case here 
because the Witkowskis were parties to the arbitration proceeding. 
Appellant's concede this in their brief. Appellant Br. 10. 
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necessarily based on the same alleged fraudulent scheme 
as the fraud claims against Welch and Historical which 
were specifically dismissed by the arbitrator. This 
conclusion was buttressed by the second amended 
complaint, which specifically incorporated Count V into 
Count II. Thus, the dismissal of the fraud claims of Count 
II necessarily barred the fraudulent conveyance issue 
alleged in Count V. 
 
The Witkowskis dispute this reasoning, asserting two 
distinct arguments in support of their position. First, they 
correctly point out that "[t]he arbitrator dismissed only all 
of Plaintiffs' state common law claims . . .." Appellants' Br. 
at 10. Thus, the dismissal of state common law fraud is not 
fatal to a statutory claim under the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("the UFCA"). 39 Pa.Stat.Ann. 
SS 351-363 (1991).11 Second, the finding of self-dealing and 
breach of fiduciary duty amounts to a finding of fraud 
under the federal common law embodied in the statutory 
scheme of ERISA. Thus, argue the Witkowskis, thisfinding 
is tantamount to a finding of facts sufficient to support 
Srein's independent liability as a "non-fiduciary knowingly 
participating in a fiduciary's breach of trust . ..." 
Appellants' Br. at 13.12 In sum, the Witkowskis believe they 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In Pennsylvania, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA") 
was repealed and re-enacted by the Act of December 3, 1993, P.L. 479, 
No. 70, codified at 12 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. 5101-5110, and renamed the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"). The UFTA is applicable to 
transfers made after its effective date of February 1, 1994. The transfer 
which is the subject of the present appeal took place in 1991, therefore, 
the UFCA is still applicable to this matter. 
 
12. The Witkowskis claim that Srein is liable under Federal common law, 
discerned from the provisions of ERISA and trust law principles, for a 
non-fiduciary knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach of duty. See 
Lowden v. Tower Asset Management, 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d. Cir. 
1987). This second argument can be disposed of because it was never 
made to the District Court. This Court consistently holds that arguments 
made for the first time on appeal, will generally not be considered. 
Harris 
v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). Before the 
submissions to this court, Count V seemingly concerned only the 
fraudulent transfer. Nowhere was Srein's potential liability as a non- 
fiduciary under federal common law based on ERISA raised. This 
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should be given the opportunity to prove that they were 
creditors of Historical, that a fraudulent transfer of 
Historical's only asset was made through its general 
partner Welch to Srein, without any consideration passing 
to Historical, and that Historical was rendered insolvent by 
virtue of this conveyance. 
 
We disagree. While we are sympathetic to a prevailing 
plaintiff who seeks to somehow satisfy a substantial 
judgment against a seemingly judgment-proof defendant, 
established judicial principles and their application to the 
record before us cannot be ignored. That record 
demonstrates that a plain reading of the second amended 
complaint, an understanding of how the issues got to 
arbitration, confirmed by extensive testimony at the 
arbitration hearing and an analysis of the legal issues 
raised in the complaint and covered during arbitration--but 
pressed to be litigated once again only now in federal court 
--lead to the inescapable conclusion that "the ultimate and 
controlling issues have been decided in a prior proceeding 
in which the present parties actually had an opportunity to 
appear and assert their rights." Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 
389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622, 627, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832, 
78 S.Ct. 46, 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957) (citations omitted). 
 
The second amended complaint asserted five counts 
against numerous defendants.13 Count I describes the 
$150,000 investment the Witkowskis made in Historical 
Second Street Associates, at the direction of Welch. It then 
asserts that this constituted self-dealing and a breach of 
Welch's fiduciary duty, and demands judgment for losses 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 1109(a), a provision of ERISA. 
Count II repeats these same allegations concerning the 
$150,000 investment and alleges that this was part of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
includes in the Witkowskis' submissions in opposition to Srein's first 
summary judgment motion, which extensively discusses the fraudulent 
conveyance issue, App. 80-87, as well as in the Witkowskis' opposition 
to Srein's motion to amend and for summary judgment, App. 201-07. 
Having not raised this issue below, this court need not and will not 
comment on its merit or viability in the Third Circuit. 
 
13. Counts III and IV are not relevant to the present appeal. 
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scheme to defraud the Witkowskis and convert their 
moneys to other uses. Of significance in this count is that 
it specifically incorporates the remaining paragraphs of the 
complaint, and thus, it covers the "scheme and artifice to 
defraud and obtain money from Plaintiffs by means of false 
and fraudulent activities, omissions, nondisclosures and 
misrepresentations as set forth" in the remaining counts, 
including Count V. App. 24. Judgment was demanded there 
for $150,000 plus interest, which presumably must refer to 
the $150,000 investment by the Witkowskis into Historical. 
Thus, Count II, by its own terms, covered the fraudulent 
conveyance issue with respect to Welch and Historical and 
which the Witkowskis now attempt to revive only against 
Srein. 
 
The process by which this case and different counts of 
the complaint reached arbitration is also necessary to 
understanding that which the arbitrator considered. 
Originally, the District Court ordered that Counts I, II and 
V be submitted to arbitration. Upon Srein's motion for 
reconsideration, however, the court held that "Count V of 
the Complaint involving Defendant Srein shall not be 
compelled to arbitration[.]" A fair reading of this second 
order, given the arbitrator's indications quoted infra, 
suggests that Count V was removed from the arbitrator's 
purview only as to the defendant Srein. 
 
This reading of the complaint and the District Court's 
orders are no doubt ambiguous, which may have been the 
precise reason why the arbitrator himself also attempted to 
define the issues with the assistance of both parties. In the 
following colloquy, Mr. Caine is the arbitrator, Mr. Doty and 
Mr. Scutti represent the plaintiff Witkowskis, and Mr. 
Grimes represents the defendant Welch. 
 
       MR. CAINE: I'm attempting to define the issues so that 
       anybody who looks at this transcript later on will know 
       what it is that we're going to deal with in terms of the 
       issues which are before us ... 
 
       * * * 
 
       As I understand it, the questions that are being raised 
       in this matter are, one, did Mr. Welch, who is one of 
       the respondents in this matter, breach any duty to the 
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       claimants as a result of one, the investment by the 
       claimant of the sum of $150,000 in Historical Second 
       Street Development Associates. And the second 
 
       question is whether the transfer of that investment to 
       Mr. Srein without adequate consideration was a 
       voidable transaction relative to the claimants. Is that a 
       fair statement? 
 
       MR. DOTY: Yes. 
 
       MR. CAINE: Mr. Scutti? 
 
       MR. SCUTTI: Yes. 
 
       MR. GRIMES: As I understand the claimant's claim. 
 
       MR. CAINE: Now as I understand it, the remedies being 
       requested by the claimant in this matter are, one, an 
       award for monetary damages not to exceed $150,000 
       plus interest, costs, and attorneys fees; is that correct, 
       Mr. Doty? 
 
       MR. DOTY: Correct. 
 
       MR. CAINE: Two, that there is a demand for a 
       reconveyance of the Historical Second Street 
       Development Associates, something that was made to 
       Mr. Srein -- apparently a conveyance of some kind.  
 
       MR. SCUTTI: I think, sir, the best way to describe it 
       would be a reconveyance of the property 70-72 North 
       Second Street. 
 
       MR. CAINE: From ... 
 
       MR. SCUTTI: From Srein back to Historical Second 
       Street Development Associates. 
 
       MR. CAINE: Does that fairly state the remedy you're 
       seeking with regards to the reconveyance issue? 
 
       MR. SCUTTI: Yes. 
 
       MR. CAINE: Three, that you're asking for the 
       reinstatement of the mortgage as collateral security for 
       Dr. WITKOWSKI's investment; is that correct? 
 
       MR. DOTY: That is correct. 
 
App. 284-287 (emphasis added). 
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This discussion made it clear what the arbitrator was 
considering; the evidence and testimony subsequently 
submitted confirmed this fact. Nonetheless, the clear 
framing of the issues and evidence considered during the 
hearing is not determinative as to whether such issues were 
actually resolved one way or the other. And the arbitrator's 
award was not a model of clarity as to what was and was 
not decided.14 Yet, the framing of the issues before the 
arbitrator and the record created during such proceedings 
inform this Court's analysis of what the arbitrator's 
ultimate award means. Such an award was not created in 
a vacuum; neither can it be interpreted in one. 
 
Turning to the award itself, the District Court found that 
the non-ERISA claims, including the fraudulent conveyance 
issue, were inextricably linked to the same alleged 
fraudulent scheme dismissed by the arbitrator. We agree. 
Implicit in the arbitrator's award is that neither Historical 
nor Welch, as its General Partner, committed the fraud 
complained of in plaintiffs' complaint. Indeed, the only 
place in plaintiffs' complaint where Welch is recognized as 
the General Partner of Historical (or any other entity for 
that matter) is in Count V, the fraudulent conveyance 
claim. Yet, in the arbitration award, the "claims of 
CLAIMANTS against . . . ROBERT G. WELCH, GENERAL 
PARTNER [were] denied." App. 134. Thus, this fraud issue 
which was clearly addressed in arbitration was also 
dismissed as to a party who was only named in the 
fraudulent conveyance count. In this manner, it is clear 
that dismissal of the fraudulent conveyance issue was 
`essential' to the arbitrator's award.15 Even if there was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The American Arbitration Association in fact discourages arbitrators 
from specifying the bases of their decisions, fearing that such 
specification would open up avenues of appeal for unsuccessful litigants. 
See G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of 
Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 632 (1988). 
 
15. Some Pennsylvania courts state that there are actually five--instead 
of four--elements to the issue preclusion doctrine. The fifth element 
requires that the determination of an issue in the prior case must have 
been `essential' to the previous judgment. See Mellon Bank v. Rafsky, 
369 Pa.Super. 585, 593, 535 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1987). Whether there are 
four or five formal elements to the doctrine is not of consequence, nor is 
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a precise identity of the `causes of action' asserted, it would 
be of no legal consequence; there is no such requirement 
for the application of issue preclusion. Only the issues need 
be the same. See Rider, 850 F.2d at 990 n. 11. And in this 
case, the issues were "in substance the same" as that 
which the Witkowskis press to litigate once again. Raytech 
Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Accordingly, the identity of issues requirement is fulfilled in 
this case. 
 
C. 
 
The final requirement for the application of estoppel is 
that the party against whom it is asserted must have had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question 
in the prior proceeding. The District Court found that the 
appellants did indeed have an opportunity to fully and 
fairly litigate the fraudulent conveyance issue, citing as 
proof the portion of the arbitration dealing with the tracing 
of funds from Srein to the Second Street property, the 
closing presentation of plaintiffs' counsel in which he asked 
for a reconveyance, and the proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law plaintiffs submitted to the arbitrator. 
 
The Witkowskis argue, unconvincingly, that "Dr. 
Witkowski's counsel could have presented compelling 
argument and evidence regarding a fraudulent transfer, but 
the Arbitrator would not and refused to make findings on 
that issue, as he believed Count V in its entirety had been 
ordered out of the arbitration proceedings." Appellants' Br. 
19. Yet the record demonstrates otherwise. 
 
The portions of the transcript quoted by the Witkowskis 
in support of their claimed inability to argue the fraudulent 
conveyance are selectively chosen, and indeed parsed from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
it for us to decide. In any event, the doctrine is essentially the same 
under either analysis. Even with just the four formal elements, clearly 
there must be a nexus between the first two. In other words, "[t]he 
identical issue must have been necessary to final judgment on the 
merits." Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 564, 669 A.2d 309, 
313 (1995) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 
66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). 
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a much fuller record. For example, appellants quote the 
following. 
 
       Mr. Caine: Now, I repeat that Counts I and II are the 
       claims to be arbitrated. Actually, Count II is the only 
       claim, and Count I is incorporated by reference, and, 
       therefore, the matters set forth in Counts I and II are 
       the claims to be arbitrated, and those Counts I and II 
       are set forth in the Federal Court Complaint which has 
       been attached to the submission in this case; is that 
       correct? 
 
       Mr. Grimes: That's correct. (Welch's attorney) 
 
       Mr. Doty: That's correct. (The Witkowskis' attorney) 
 
       Mr. Caine: I want the record to show that. 
 
App. 283. 
 
What the Witkowskis fail to include, however, is what 
followed that exchange. Mr. Caine, the arbitrator, continued 
speaking and, putting into context the previous excerpts, 
said the following: 
 
       MR. CAINE: As I understand it, this claim is also 
       limited to the matters involving the Historical Second 
       Street Development Associates, 70-72 North 2nd 
       Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; is that correct? 
 
       MR. DOTY: Yes; however, collateral to that is the 
       matter of St. George Mortgage Associates, which has to 
       do with Historical. 
 
       MR. CAINE: You're not precluded bringing in or from 
       mentioning any related matters. 
 
       MR. DOTY: Okay. 
 
       MR. CAINE: It's just my understanding that the 
       investment in the Historical Second Street Associates, 
       70-72 North Second Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
       was the basis for the claim -- 
 
       MR. DOTY: Arbitration; that's correct. 
 
       MR. CAINE: -- which is now being arbitrated. 
 
       MR. DOTY: That's correct. 
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       MR. CAINE: I'm attempting to define the issues so that 
       anybody who looks at this transcript later on will know 
       what it is that we're going to deal with in terms of the 
       issues which are before us, and I don't want to go all 
       over the field and get involved in all kinds of matters 
       that are not relevant, so I'm defining the scope of 
       what's relevant, if I may, and please correct me if you 
       want to modify these in any way. 
 
App. 283 - 285. 
 
The discussion continued as to the remedies requested, 
which is quoted verbatim above in the section on the 
identity of issues. As that revealed, both sides to the 
arbitration and the arbitrator understood at that time that 
the fraudulent conveyance issue was very much at issue. 
 
Following that exchange, there was also a discussion on 
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to actually reconvey the 
property in issue, because Srein, as the titled owner, was 
not a party to the arbitration. The arbitrator recognized 
this, but in a foretelling comment, noted the following: 
 
       I would agree with that [that the arbitrator did not 
       have the power to reconvey the property]. That doesn't 
       mean that I can't make a finding that the property 
       shouldn't be conveyed, and if somebody wants to use 
       that in some other proceeding, they might be able to do 
       that. They might bring an action against Mr. Srein and 
       say somehow the issue is to litigate, and whether 
       anybody would argue that's res judicata as to Srein 
       and binding upon him, I don't know. 
 
        But if we find it is a fraud, that's something which I 
       might find could be done or should be done or 
       recommended that it be done. So I'll deal with that 
       when the time comes. 
 
App. 288-89. 
 
The record does not reflect any objection to these 
statements. Instead, the record reflects an explicit 
understanding that the arbitrator's findings might have 
preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. 
 
The Witkowskis also claim that Srein was unavailable to 
present any evidence or participate in any other way in the 
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proceedings, which thus prevented them from fully and 
fairly litigating the claims against him. Again, the record 
demonstrates that this is only partly correct. While Srein 
was not a party to the arbitration and did not in fact 
participate nor would he voluntarily, he could have been 
subpoenaed as a witness. Discussions were held on the 
record in which the arbitrator made clear his power--and 
willingness--to subpoena any witness necessary to either 
side's case. App. 519-20. No explanation is given why these 
witnesses were never called. Indeed, there is nothing else 
besides this testimony that the Witkowskis have cited 
which they contend they did not have the opportunity to 
present at the arbitration. 
 
Moreover, the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted by the Witkowskis, including six pages detailing 
what allegedly happened concerning the conveyance, 
proposed that the transfer be declared fraudulent under 
Pennsylvania law App. 156-61. This submission is 
indicative of the range and scope of the arbitration hearing 
and the relief sought by plaintiffs. 
 
A party does not have an opportunity for a full and fair 
hearing when "procedures fall below the minimum 
requirements of due process as defined by federal law." 
Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1074. See also Kremer v. Chemical 
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, 72 
L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (full and fair opportunity to litigate 
presumed when state proceedings satisfy minimum 
procedural requirements of due process); Rider, 850 F.2d at 
991. The extensive arbitration hearing held here did not fall 
below this standard. That the arguments made during the 
arbitration hearing were not accepted in full by the 
arbitrator does not mean that the Witkowskis were 
prevented from fully presenting them. The District Court 
did not err in its decision to apply the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. The Witkowskis cannot now be heard to complain 
that they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue. 
 
D. 
 
The original defendant, Welch, apparently manipulated 
many different corporations he controlled and investors he 
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courted to obtain and then manipulate funds. The fall-out 
of the real estate market in the late 1980s led to the 
collapse of his scheme. In the case of the Witkowskis, he 
squandered their investment. The evidence the arbitrator 
received relating to all of this was quite extensive and 
permitted him to determine that Welch breached his 
fiduciary duty owed to the Witkowskis. 
 
The Witkowskis have a judgment against Welch for their 
full investment based on this, and understandably, they are 
looking to reach assets with which to satisfy it. The former 
property of Historical at 70-72 North Second Street is the 
most logical candidate. Yet the extensive record 
demonstrates that the arbitrator considered all of the facts, 
at least with respect to Welch and all related entities, and 
dismissed with one exception the claims of Counts I and II. 
This necessarily included, for all the foregoing reasons, the 
fraudulent conveyance claim. Despite the Witkowskis' 
protestations to the contrary, the District Court did not err 
in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to dismiss the 
suit against Srein. 
 
The District Court wrote in a footnote that, 
 
       It would be an anomalous result to have Welch and 
       Welch P.C. cleared of any liability for the alleged 
       fraudulent scheme to convert assets of the Plan, while 
       the same claims could still proceed against Srein, 
       whose only alleged involvement in the transaction was 
       to accept a mortgage on the Second Street Property to 
       satisfy a judgment against Welch. 
 
(D.C. Opinion, April 14, 1997, p. 6 n.4). To this we add the 
teachings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, writing in a 
related context: 
 
       [I]f the defendant's responsibility is necessarily 
       dependent upon the culpability of another, who was 
       the immediate actor, and who, in an action against him 
       by the same plaintiff for the same act, has been 
       adjudged not culpable, the defendant may have the 
       benefit of that judgment as an estoppel, even though 
       he would not have been bound by it had it been the 
       other way. And we think it could not well be otherwise, 
       for, when the plaintiff has litigated directly with the 
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       immediate actor the claim that he was culpable, and, 
       upon the full opportunity thus afforded for its legal 
       investigation, the claim has been adjudged against the 
       plaintiff, there is manifest propriety, and no injustice, 
       in holding that he is thereby concluded from making it 
       the basis of a right of recovery from another who is not 
       otherwise responsible. 
 
C.S. Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21, 32-33, 131 
A.2d 622, 628, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832, 78 S.Ct. 46, 2 
L.Ed.2d 44 (1957). We find this reasoning persuasive and 
applicable to this case. Here, the fraud and fraudulent 
conveyance issues brought against Welch and Srein are so 
inextricably intertwined with one another that the disposal 
of the claims against the one is necessarily fatal to the 
alleged claim against the other. 
 
This opinion, similar to the briefs submitted, is 
necessarily fact intensive as the facts are what complicate 
this issue. In holding that collateral estoppel applies to this 
unique case, we caution against its invocation in most 
others without extreme care. Indeed, doubts about its 
application should usually be resolved against its use. See 
Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.1970) 
("Reasonable doubt as to what was decided by a prior 
judgment should be resolved against using it as an 
estoppel.") While we are mindful of these concerns and feel 
it necessary to address them specifically, they are not 
implicated in the facts of this case, and thus not a bar to 
issue preclusion applied here. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
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